Abstract: STorage as a Service (STaaS) cloud platforms benefits such as getting access to data anywhere, anytime, on a wide range of devices made them very popular among businesses and individuals. As such forensics investigators are increasingly facing cases that involve investigation of STaaS platforms. Therefore, it is essential for cyber investigators to know how to collect, preserve, and analyse evidences of these platforms. In this paper, we describe investigation of three STaaS platforms namely SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud on Windows 8.1 and iOS 8.1.1 devices. Moreover, possible changes on uploaded and downloaded files metadata on these platforms would be tracked and their forensics value would be investigated.
Introduction
Cloud computing enables businesses and individual to access computing resources such as servers and storages on an on-demand basis, where resources can be quickly provisioned with minimal efforts and interaction with the service provider (Mell & Grance, 2011) . The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) broadly categorised cloud computing services into three categories: 1.
Software as a Service (SaaS): When an application is used to access shared infrastructure of the Cloud Storage Service Provider (CSSP). A popular example of SaaS is Storage-as-a-Service (STaaS) cloud systems. 2.
Platform as a Service (PaaS): Users may deploy their own applications on the CSSP's infrastructure 3.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The CSSP provides the underlying computing resources for the deployment of software (including Operation System (OS)) by the users (Mell & Grance, 2011) .
The increasing popularity of STaaS and the potential for such services to be criminally exploited have attracted the attention of policing and forensics scholars in recent years (Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & bin Shamsuddin, 2012) . Many emerging and new platforms are now based on cloud services to operate. As noted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2014) , cloud forensics is the application of scientific rules, technological exercises and approved methods to rebuild past events of crime committed in the cloud computing environment.
A number of researchers have reported data collection and preservation (A Aminnezhad, Dehghantanha, Abdullah, & Damshenas, 2013; Damshenas, Dehghantanha, Mahmoud, & Shamsuddin, 2014; F Daryabar & Dehghantanha, 2014; Hogben & Dekker, 2012; Hooper, Martini, & Choo, 2013; D Quick, Martini, & Choo, 2014) , cloud malware detection Farid Daryabar & Ali Dehghantanha, 2011) analysis and even privacy (Asou Aminnezhad & Ali Dehghantanha, 2012; Farid Daryabar, Dehghantanha, Udzir, & Fazlida, 2013; Dehghantanha & Franke, 2014) as main challenges during investigation of cloud platforms. As explained by Martini and Choo (2014a) , "the large number of open challenges presented in a report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2014) demonstrates that, at the time of the research, cloud forensics remains an unresolved and somewhat under researched area of enquiry".
Although a number of STaaS have been examined (see Table 1 ), researchers (K.-K. R. Choo & Smith, 2008 ; K.-K. R. Choo, 2008) have posited that organized crime and cyber criminals are innovative and will constantly seek to "innovate" in order to evade the scrutiny and reach of law enforcement, such as using other STaaS to store incriminating evidence.
ensure that their stored data will not be surrendered to law enforcement agencies by the cloud service provider.
JustCloud allows users to synchronize, create backup, and share files. In file synchronization, a folder is created on the user's desktop after JustCloud's client application is installed, which enables the user to access data stored on all devices where the client application has been installed.
Users may store, sync, and share their files using pCloud. A unique feature of this CSSP is the upload link. User can have files uploaded on their space by those who have access to the upload link. This CSSP is also capable of making backup from other services including Dropbox, Facebook, Instagram, and Picasa. Table 2 briefly compares the features of aforementioned services. In this paper, we answer the following questions:
(1) What artifacts of forensic interest can be recovered from the Random Access Memory (RAM) and the Hard Disk (HDD) of a Windows device after using SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud services via Internet Explorer (IE), Firefox (Fx), and Google Chrome (GC) browsers? (2) What artifacts of forensic interest can be recovered from the RAM and HDD of a Windows device after using SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud services via the respective client Windows applications? (3) What artifacts of forensic interest can be recovered from the internal memory and internal storage of an iPhone device after using SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud services via the respective iOS applications? (4) Whether the contents or the metadata of the investigated files change during the process of uploading and downloading, and whether the timestamp information of the downloaded files is reliable?
Research will be conducted on Windows 8.1 and iOS devices. At the time of research, Windows 8.1 is the latest version of Microsoft desktop OS and iOS is one of the most popular mobile platforms (Net Applications, 2014a .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the forensic framework used to guide the research and the experiment setup. The findings from the analysis of SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud are presented in sections 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Finally, the last section concludes this paper.
Research methodology

Cloud forensic framework
When conducting a forensic investigation, the investigator should adopt best practices such as those of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). The ACPO specifies four principles for collecting and examining digital evidence (Williams, 2012) :  Principle 1: Data which may subsequently be relied upon in a court of law should not be changed.  Principle 2: In the event that a person needs to access the original data, that person must be suitably qualified and is able to justify and explain the implications of the actions.  Principle 3: An appropriate auditing and record-keeping processes should be in place which would ensure that an independent third party would be able to examine the recorded processes and achieve the same result.  Principle 4: The investigating officer needs to ensure that the law and these principles are adhered to.
It is also common practice that a forensic framework be used to guide the investigation. In the context of our paper, we adopt the cloud forensic framework introduced by Martini and Choo (Martini & Choo, 2012) . This is, perhaps, the first digital forensic framework designed to conduct both client and server investigations of cloud services. The framework has also been validated by the authors using ownCloud , (Martini & Choo, 2014b) , (Martini & Choo, 2014c) , and by Thethi and Keane (2014) on EC2 cloud. There are four stages in this framework, namely: evidence source identification and preservation, collection, examination and analysis, and reporting and presentation for collecting digital evidence from the cloud environment. 1. Evidence Source Identification, Collection and Preservation. In this phase, potential sources of relevant data are identified. Any device capable of connecting to STaaS, either via a browser or a client application, is considered a potential source of evidence. In this phase, the investigator should also ensure that ACPO principles are adhered to, wherever possible. During collection of evidence from storage media, particularly media belonging to external parties, the investigator should also ensure that relevant laws and regulations are followed (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006) . In this research, the .vmem and vmdk files of each virtual machine (VM) were collected with extension E0 using AccessData FTK Imager. The former was cloned while the VM was running, whereas the latter was duplicated after the VM was shut down. The logs of Wireshark, recording communications between VMs and the respective STaaS were also acquired at this stage. The MD5 hash checksum of collected evidence files were documented. 2. Examination and analysis. Information from acquired data is extracted in this phase. Methods to circumvent or bypass protection mechanism on the devices may be used to examine and analyze information collected and preserved from the previous phase (e.g. use of tools to brute-force password-protected data).
During this phase, findings should also be reviewed with information or intelligence drawn from other sources and investigations (e.g. see metadata analysis described in Sections 3 to 5; and (D ) before a conclusion is drawn. 3. Presentation. In the last phase, findings are documented for presentation in a court of law (Kent et al., 2006) .
Experiment setup
Windows
The Windows-based experiments were implemented on VMs using VMware Player 6.0.1. The following files with forensic value were collected and examined:
 .vmem file: A paging file that includes the backup of the VM's main memory (VMware Inc., n.d.).  .vmdk file: A virtual disk file that stores the contents of the VM's hard disk drive (VMware Inc., n.d.).
Windows 8.1 Build 9600 along with IE 11.0.9600.16384, Fx 33.0.2, and GC 38.0.2125.111 m were installed on a VM with 25 GB hard disk and 1 GB memory. In this research, 14 files from a dd image file developed by Carrier (2004) were used as the dataset (see Table 3 ). The original dd image file was mounted on the VM using OSFMount 1.5. Table 3 . Files used in the Windows-based experiment From the base VM, the following snapshots were created:  VM-W1: A SpiderOak account was created using IE.  VM-W2: A SpiderOak account was created on Fx.  VM-W3: A SpiderOak account was created using GC.  VM-W4: A JustCloud account was created using IE.  VM-W5: A JustCloud account was created on Fx.  VM-W6: A JustCloud account was created using GC.  VM-W7: A pCloud account was created on IE.  VM-W8: A pCloud account was created on Fx in this VM.  VM-W9: A pCloud account was created using GC.  VM-W10: The SpiderOak's client application was installed. Sample files were also uploaded and downloaded using the client application.  VM-W11: The JustCloud's client application was installed, and a series of uploading and downloading of sample files using the client application was undertaken.  VM-W12: The pCloud's client application was installed.  VM-W16: A series of downloading of sample files using SpiderOak with IE.  VM-W17: Sample file were downloaded using SpiderOak via Fx.  VM-W18: A series of downloading of sample files using SpiderOak with GC.  VM-W19: A series of downloading of sample files using JustCloud with IE.  VM-W20: A series of downloading of sample files using JustCloud with Fx.  VM-W21: A series of downloading of sample files using JustCloud with GC.  VM-W22: A series of downloading of sample files using pCloud with IE.  VM-W23: A series of downloading of sample file using pCloud with Fx.  VM-W24: A series of downloading of sample files using pCloud with GC. Each of the STaaS accounts created was linked to a specific email address created for this research (see Table 4 ). VM-W10, VM-W11, and VM-W12 were shut down and cloned respectively to VM-W13, VM-W14, and VM-W15. They were used for the investigation of data remnants after uninstallation of the client applications. On the last nine VMs (i.e. VM-W15 to VM-W24), the sample files were uploaded and downloaded using the respective browsers. On VM-W10, VM-W-11 and VM-W16 to VM-W24, MD5 checksum of the downloaded files were recorded and compared with the original ones.
In all our experiments, we configured the browsers and client applications to decline storing the passwords. In additional, prior to cloning each .vmem file, the corresponding browser was closed without the user signing out. The base VM was configured to create only one .vmdk file, and other VMs were generated by taking snapshots of the base .vmdk file. VMware Virtual Disk Manager Utility was used to merge the base .vmdk file with the snapshot files in order to make creating of the image file using FTK Imager possible.
iOS
In the iOS-based experiments, SpiderOak 3.1.1, JustCloud 1.3.11, and pCloud 1.11.15 apps were installed on an iPhone 5S device with iOS 8.1.1.
The following files were collected for further analysis on a personal computer (PC): More specifically, for IE versions 10 and 11, the browser database is stored in an Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) file named WebCacheV01.dat (Malmström & Teveldal, 2013) . The tables to be examined are contained in the ESE file located in %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\.  SQLite Manger was used to extract sqlite files of Fx and GC.  DCode Date (Wilson, n.d.) was used for converting dates and times from hex, epoch, and WebKit formats to human readable format.  Thumbcache Viewer 1.0.2.7 was used to extract thumbcache files.  FTK Imager was used to analyze other files of interest.  iExplorer was used for mounting and browsing iPhone backups.
Files from each of the E0 files that containing matching keywords were identified and filtered for further analysis -see Table 5 . 
The iPhone backups were also searched for user email address, name, IDs, and 2 pCloud registration process does not ask for the name of the account.
password.
Findings: SpiderOak
Observations: SpiderOak's account created using the respective browsers
We were able to recover various information associated with the creation of the SpiderOak's account using the respective browsers -see Tables 6 to 8 . The "spideroak" word, email address, ID, and name of the created account Browser related files
The email address used in signing up process (see Figure 2 ) The date and the UTC time of visiting Unallocated space
The email address, the ID and the full name of the registered account (see Figure 3 ) Other files SpiderOak's website was observed in a file located in %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations "spideroak" word, the email address, the ID, the name, and the password of the created account (see Figure 4 ) Browser related files Information about visited spideroak.com with the date and the UTC time of the last visit and "spideroak.com" word, the email address, the full name, and the ID of the created account Unallocated space
The email address of the created account Other files SpiderOak's website was seen in a file in %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations Memory. SpiderOak, the username, the email address, and the password of the created the account along with the share ID (with the date and the time of creation), the shared URL and its password, the name of the shared folder, the name of the downloaded files, the name of the created sync and its folder on the host and on the target device, all were obtained from the collected vmem file (see Figure 5 and Figure 6 ). Client application files. Client information such as the username, the share ID, RoomKey, the name of the shared folder, the name of the downloaded files, the name of the created sync and its folder on the host and on the target device as well as the date and the time of launched backup and synchronization were seen in %AppData%\SpiderOak\spider_###############.log. In the log file, an IP address was found which was appeared to be used for broadcasting on ports 21327 and 21328. The three first octal were the same as the device's IP address. In the oak_###############.log, similar events regarding the application along with the date and the time of occurrence were found. In %AppData%\SpiderOak\config.txt, the Hive path was observed. Files in %AppData%\SpiderOak\Sync contained the details of created syncs including the date and the time of their processing and source and destination paths, all, in SQLite format.
MFT. The sync name, the downloading folder name, and the installation filename were identified in the MFT$.
Registry. Installation filename and its storing path were found in the following keys:
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store  HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Compatibility Assistant\Store
Moreover, SpiderOak's client application created inbound rules on both TCP and UDP protocols in Windows Firewall. The related keys' paths are as follow:
Prefetch. Installation filename was observed in Prefetch folder. Paging file. The installation filename and the name of the downloaded files and their storing path were located in pagefile.sys. Windows events. In the Application node, some records linked to the client application installation were located.
Based on the collected MD5 checksums, apart from file13.dll, the contents of other sample files were preserved by the CSSP. We were not able to restore ADS from file13.dll. Metadata of file12.doc such as Authors value remained the same as the original file. It was also evident that the Modified value of downloaded files did not alter. However, we observed that the values of Created and Accessed fields were changed to the date and the time of downloading (see Figure 7 ).
Observations: Uninstalling SpiderOak's Application Program
Memory. Although the uninstall wizard asked for restart, restarting did not occur. Aside from the password of the shared URL, the result of memory analysis is similar to that reported in Section 3.2 (see Figure 8 ). Client application files. After uninstalling SpiderOak on VM-W13, we observed that the Hive folder and its contents remained. We were also able to locate the files located in %AppData%\SpiderOak\ previously discussed in Section 3.2. MFT and paging file. Both MFT and paging file contained spideroak word, the sync name, and downloading folder name. NTFS log. "spideroak.exe" was observed in $LogFile. Registry. The following keys pointed to spideroak.exe after uninstalling: Unallocated space. The spideroak word, the sync name, the sync folder name on the target machine, and downloading folder name were located in the unallocated space.
Other files. We located information indicating the name of the downloading folder in %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Search\Data\Applications\Windows\GatherLogs\SystemIn dex\SystemIndex.2.gthr and %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4C77-AF34-C647E37CA0D9}.1.ver0x0000000000000004.db. Downloading folder name was also seen in NTUSER.DAT, and ntuser.dat.LOG1. The latter was located in %UserProfile%. Several other files we located also contained the spideroak.exe word.
Observations: Downloading from SpiderOak using the respective browsers
We were able to collect information with forensic value associated with the downloading from SpiderOak using the respective browsers -see Tables 9 to 11 . The username and the device name were visible in the URL (see Figure 9 ), shared title -the page was browsed -, and download folder name (SO Downloaded Files) Browser logs
The URLs of SpiderOak that were visited along with the date and the UTC time of browsing, the downloading folder name and its path, the username stated in a URL, and the device name MFT and NTFS log The device name, the downloading folder name, the RoomKey, and the shared title (see Figure 10 ) Registry In addition to Typed URL, the following keys pointed to spideroak.com: Figures 10 and 11) . The name of the downloaded file Both sessionstore.js and places.sqlite-wal were located in the same path contained the shared title and the username, and the shared title were located in several files in %LocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\cache2\entries\ and a file located in %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\. The latter also included the username and the name of the downloaded file. The username was also found in %ProgramFiles%\Google\Update\1.3.25.5\goopdateres_is.dll. As depicted in Figure 12 , in places.sqlite and the moz_annos table, the name of the downloaded file was observed. MFT spideroak.com and the downloaded filename were seen in $MFT NTFS log
The name of the downloaded file was seen in $LogFile Link
The only related link file observed was %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\e_.lnk, which referred to an archive of all sample files downloaded from SpiderOak Unallocated space spideroak.com, the device name, username were visible in the URL, and the downloaded filename were located in the unallocated space.
Other files
The name of the downloaded file was observed in the below files:
• %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01.lo g and WebCacheV01.dat • %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1 • %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J According to the recorded MD5 checksums, the contents of the downloaded files, with the exception of file13.dll, remained intact. We were not able to restore ADS from file13.dll. Metadata of file12.doc such as Authors value remained the same as the original file. Unlike the result presented in Section 3.2, in addition to Created and Accessed fields, Modified value was also changed to the date and the time of downloading.
Observations: Browsing and downloading from SpiderOak's iOS app
As shown in Figure 13 , a file named Cache.db-wal located in \Apps\SpiderOak\Library\Caches\com.spideroak.SpiderOak\nsurlcache contained valuable information regarding the registered account and created backups and syncs. Figure 13 . Cache.db-wal containing some details of the account and created backups and syncs Downloaded files were located in \Apps\SpiderOak\tmp\.caches, and \Apps\SpiderOak\Library\Caches\com.spideroak.SpiderOak\nsurlcache\fsCachedData. The dates and the times of Modified fields were identical to the date and the time of loading into the smartphone.
Apart from the file13.dll, the MD5 signatures of the sample files were the same as the original files. Modified date was pointing to the download time. The name and the email address of the created account The "justcloud" word and the email address of the created account were observed in the collected vmem file. Browser related files
In %LocalAppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\cache2\entries, the following files were indicating justcloud.com was browsed:
 FC83C509516A560D495BCDD9C0C0025E0BB16907 Information regarding cookies and histories were found in cookies.sqlite, places.sqlite, and permissions.sqlite. The date and the UTC time of visiting were retrieved from the two first files. Unallocated space
The full name and the email address of the created account 184.154.150.158, 192.168.74.139, 68.67.128.156, 173.194.112.77, 54.246.114.22, 104.219.49.71, 217.163.21.34, 94.31.29.154, 74.125.136.95, 208.71.121.1, 195.59.150.17, 173.194.112.68, 107.21.26.11, 94.31.29.237, 23.251.128.113, 207.46.194.10, 204.79.197.200, 184.154.150.133, and 10.10.34 Memory. The installation filename and its storing path, the name and the email address of the created account, the date and the time of account creation were observed in the memory. Client application files. In %ProgramFiles%\JustCloud\Database, the following files of forensic interest were identified:
 mpcb_settings.db contained the email address and the computer name used to log in.  mpcb_backup_conf.db included the name of the files that were browsed to be backed up.
Also in %ProgramFiles%\JustCloud\log, the below key files were found:
 BACKUP.log contained a history of created backups along with the date and the time.  LICENCE.log included the number of days that the account had been created and the name of the account.  APPLICATION.log contained the date and the time of executing the program.  DOWNLOADER.log included the details of a download failure occurred during downloading sample files.  ONLINE_FOLDER.log contained the names of downloaded files. The below files contained "JustCloud.exe":
MFT
.db  %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1  %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve and Amcache.hve.LOG1  %SystemRoot%\System32\config\RegBack\SOFTWARE  %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE.LOG1, SOFTWARE.LOG2, SYSTEM, and SYSTEM.LOG1.  %SystemRoot%\System32\config\TxR\{b7bee95a-0b1a-11e3-93fc-90b11c043665}.TxR.0.regtrans-ms  %SystemRoot%\System32\sru\SRU.log, SRU00008.log, and SRUDB.dat
From our experiments, we determined that JustCloud does not allow the uploading of files with an invalid extension and users attempting to do so will be presented with an error message -"Failed: The remote server returned an error: (403) Forbidden.". Recorded MD5 checksums showed that, the contents of sample files, with the exception of file13.dll, were preserved by this CSSP. Similar to the findings presented in Section 3.2, we were not able to restore ADS from file13.dll. Metadata of file12.doc were not altered. The values of Created, Modified, and Accessed fields were changed to the date and the time of downloading.
Observations: Uninstalling JustCloud's Application Program
Memory. With the exception of not able to locate the email address of the account, the investigation result of the vmem file was the same as Section 4.2.
Client application files. Although the JustCloud folder was removed by the uninstalling process, they could be easily recovered using FTK Imager (see Figure 15 ). Prefetch. In the Prefetch folder, CONSENT.EXE-65F6206D.pf, JUSTCLOUD_SETUP.EXE-3C2F187F.pf, and Layout.ini contained the installation filename. Also JustCloud.exe was included in AgRobust.db, BACKUPSTACK.EXE-831F34B6.pf, Layout.ini, TASKENG.EXE-5BAF290C.pf, RUNDLL32.EXE-125D4518.pf, and JUSTCLOUD.EXE-A4042D73.pf. Windows events. A record in %SystemRoot%\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Diagnostics-Performance%4Operational.evtx pointed to justcloud.com.
Unallocated. The installation filename and the name of the account, backed up filenames with their paths, justcloud.com, and justcloud.exe were located in the unallocated space.
Other files. The scheduled task (LaunchApp) existed even after uninstallation. We observed the installation filename in the following files:
 %SystemRoot%\System32\config\SYSTEM and SYSTEM.LOG1  %SystemRoot%\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat and SRUtmp.log  %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\BootCKCL.etl  %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT and ntuser.dat.LOG1
Also the below files were pointing to JustCloud.exe:
A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000d.db and {3DA71D5A-20CC-432F-A115-DFE92379E91F}.1.ver0x000000000000000c.db  %UserProfile%\NTUSER.DAT, ntuser.dat.LOG1, and ntuser.dat.LOG2  %SystemRoot%\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve and Amcache.hve.LOG1  %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J  %SystemRoot%\System32\config\RegBack\SOFTWARE and SYSTEM  %SystemRoot%\System32\config\ SYSTEM, SYSTEM.LOG1, SOFTWARE.LOG1, SOFTWARE.LOG2 and SOFTWARE  %SystemRoot%\System32\config\TxR\{b7bee95a-0b1a-11e3-93fc-90b11c043665}.TxR.0.regtrans-ms  %SystemRoot%\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat and SRUtmp.log  %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\BootCKCL.etl  %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\StartupInfo\S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo2.xml, S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo5.xml, and S-1-5-21-1335463704-3291414260-3134846049-1001_StartupInfo1.xml  %SystemRoot%\System32\wdi\LogFiles\ WdiContextLog.etl.001, WdiContextLog.etl.002, and WdiContextLog.etl.003
Observations: Downloading from JustCloud using the respective browsers
We were able to collect information with forensic value associated with the downloading from JustCloud using the respective browsers -see Tables 15 to 17.   Table 15 : Recovered artefacts associated with downloading from JustCloud using IE Location Recovered artefacts Network traffics As shown in Figure 16, 74.125.133.95, 94.31.29.154, 173.194.45.170 and 173.194.41.40 on port 80 and 184.154.150.133, and 184.154.150 .158 on port 443. We also determined connections also took place via IP address 184.154.150.158 on port 80.
Memory
The email address and the password of the account (see Figure  17) , the names of downloaded files and the storing path Browser related files
The URLs of JustCloud with the date and the UTC time of visiting in cookies.sqlite and places.sqlite located in %AppData%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Random Name].default\. The name of downloaded files in WebCacheV01.dat and V01.log (see Figure 18 ).
MFT and NTFS log
The name of downloaded files
Unallocated space
The email address of the account and the name of downloaded files with the path of storing Other files
The name of downloaded files in %SystemDrive%\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J, %UserProfile%\ntuser.dat.LOG1 and NTUSER.DAT. justcloud.com in %ProgramFiles%\GUM5EFC.tmp\npGoogleUpdate3.dll Respecting the integrity check, the same result as Section 3.4 was obtained. The "pcloud" word Figure 19 . The email address and the password of the created pCloud account in VM-W9's vmem file
Observations: pCloud's Application Program
Network traffics. Communications between the VM and JustCloud's servers were established with IP addresses 74.120.8.17, 74.120.8.25, 74.120.8.28, 74.120.8.71, 74.120.8.74, 74.120.8.98, 74.120.8.139, 74.120.8.153, and 74.120.8 .157 on port 443. Memory. The email address of the account, the email address of the person who was invited to have access to the shared URL, the message of the invitation, and the share title were observed in vmem file. Client application files. In %LocalAppData%\pCloud\data.db, information regarding the synced files were observed. The file was in SQLite format and contained 25 tables that described files properties and folder names of synced data. For instance, as depicted in Figure 20 , the file 74.120.8.6, 74.120.8.7, 74.120.8.13, 74.120.8.14, 74.120.8.15, 74.120.8.86, and 74.120.8 The name of the downloaded file.
Other files
The name of the downloaded file in $Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J.
We determined that the MD5 checksum of sample files, except file13.dll, were not altered after downloading. However, we were not able to restore ADS from file13.dll. Metadata of file12.doc such as Authors value remained the same as the original file. It was also observed that Modified value of downloaded files was the date of uploading. The values of Created and Accessed fields were, on the other hand, changed to the date and the time of downloading. In this research, we located and described various artefacts of forensic when SpiderOak, JustCloud, and pCloud were used with IE, Fx, and GC browsers, client application, and mobile application on Windows machines and iOS devices. The recovered artefacts include email addresses, the ID, and the name of the created account and the name of the uploaded and downloaded files. Our findings also suggested that user's credentials could be recovered from memory, and the checksums of sample files after being downloading from investigated CSSPs remained identical to the original. However, we noted that none of the investigated CSSPs could prevent the timestamp and the alternate data streams (ADS) of files from being changed. Our findings also indicated that metadata of the doc file examined in this study was not altered which could be another piece of useful information in forensic investigation.
Future work would extending our work to examining machines running Linux and other less popular operation systems.
